Managing an Audit Partner’s Workload and Client Allocation – A Qualitative Study

Based on interviews with 17 audit practitioners, this study examines how audit firms allocate clients to audit partners and manage their partners’ workloads. We find that audit firms increasingly prioritize quality over other incentives when assigning partners to clients. This shift is driven by a more centralized decision-making process, supported by growing demand for audit services and staff shortages, which make central allocation more common. At the same time, firms still struggle to fully apply this quality focus in practice. Constraints such as limited staff availability, commercial incentives and mandatory rotation complicate the allocation process.

Our findings also show that individual auditors play an important role in allocation decisions. Firms often accommodate personal preferences, for example by matching partners with clients they enjoy working with or clients located conveniently. Strategic motives, such as enhancing professional identity, status or gaining new skills, also influence the process. While some of these considerations support learning, others may conflict with the aim of prioritizing quality.

We further observe that audit firms regularly meet certain client requests due to economic ties. Finally, the monitoring of client allocation is relatively weak. Although firms screen for quality at the start and end of engagements, ongoing quality evaluations are more ad hoc. Firms tend to make meaningful adjustments only when serious issues arise during the audit.