Marleen Willekens

Professor

Marleen Willekens is Full Professor of Accounting and Auditing at KU Leuven’s Faculty of Economics and Business and part-time Research Professor of Auditing at BI Norwegian Business School in Oslo. She earned her PhD in Industrial and Business Studies from Warwick Business School (UK) and holds a Master’s and Bachelor’s degree in Economics from Ghent University. Marleen has served as Vice-Dean of Research and Head of the Accounting, Finance & Insurance department at KU Leuven and currently acts as Research Coordinator for the Humanities and Social Sciences Group.Her research focuses on auditing, corporate governance, and financial reporting, including topics such as audit market competition, auditor regulation and liability, audit firm governance, and the valuation of intangible assets. She applies economic theories to understand auditor and audit firm decision-making, complemented by empirical analyses using archival and hand-collected data. Marleen has published extensively in leading journals such as Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, The Accounting Review, Accounting, Organizations and Society, and Contemporary Accounting Research. She was principal investigator for the EU Statutory Audit Reform study commissioned by the European Parliament and has secured multiple research excellence grants.Marleen is co-editor of the Routledge Companion to Auditing Research, Editor and Director of the Symposium of The International Journal of Accounting, and Associate Editor of the British Accounting Review. She previously served as Editor of Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory and on editorial boards of major accounting journals. In addition to her academic roles, she is an Independent Director and Chair of the Audit Committee at Aedifica NV/SA and Intervest Offices & Warehouses

This literature review synthesizes research on whether auditors’ commercial activity conflicts with professional obligations, or whether the two can coexist and even reinforce each other through firm-level quality controls. It frames the debate between the “trade‑off” view, where commercialism undermines professionalism, and an alternative perspective that highlights complementary roles of both logics in audit practice. The review also traces the evolution of organizational control in public accounting firms, from collegial autonomy to more formal structures, and considers how mechanisms such as technical consultations may help align commercial goals with high audit quality and engagement efficiency. Based on gaps in prior evidence, the authors call for empirical tests linking auditors’ commercial activity to individual performance evaluations, promotion decisions, and indicators of audit quality, expecting that commercial efforts can be rewarded without compromising quality.
This study tests the taken-for-granted assumption that auditors’ commercial motivation threatens audit quality using internal time reporting data from two Big Four firms in the Netherlands. The research team examined whether auditors’ commercial effort is associated with their compensation, total effort on their audit engagements, and audit engagement quality. The researchers find some evidence of a positive relation between commercial effort and compensation. They find no evidence that auditors’ commercial effort is associated with total audit effort in their portfolio and, most importantly, they find no evidence of a negative relation between auditors’ commercial effort and audit quality. This challenges widely held beliefs that commercial effort is necessarily problematic for auditing. Further, the researchers find that auditors’ commercial effort is positively related to their reliance on quality control—proxied as technical consultations—and that there is a positive indirect effect of commercial effort on audit quality via consultations. That is, they identify conditions in which auditors’ commercial effort increases audit quality, suggesting that further restrictions on commercial effort are likely unnecessary.
It is taken for granted that a fundamental conflict exists between auditors’ professional responsibilities and their commercial interests. While there is no direct evidence to support this widely held belief, it  nonetheless fuels extensive, costly regulatory and standard-setting activities. We propose to examine whether auditors’ commercial and professional motivations actually conflict. Moreover, we argue that quality control mechanisms in audit firms, e.g., performance evaluation and technical consultation  procedures, create conditions in which the two sets of motivations are likely mutually reinforcing. To test our research question, we will examine whether auditors’ commercial activity is related to indicators of audit quality such as individual performance evaluations and engagement quality reviews. We expect to find that firms reward auditors’ commercial activity. However, contrary to critics’ concerns, we also hypothesize that auditors’ commercial activity will be positively related to audit quality. For reasons discussed in this note, we argue that auditors who base their professional identity more on being successful at commercial endeavors will be more willing to access quality control mechanisms (e.g., ask for help from consultations). As far as we are aware, our examination will provide the first direct evidence on the  beneficial effects of commercial motivations for auditors.
It is taken for granted that a fundamental conflict exists between auditors’ professional responsibilities and their commercial interests. While there is no direct evidence to support this widely held belief, it  onetheless fuels extensive, costly regulatory and standard-setting activities. We propose to examine whether auditors’ commercial and professional motivations actually conflict. Moreover, we argue that  quality control mechanisms in audit firms—e.g., performance evaluation and technical consultation  procedures—create conditions in which the two sets of motivations are likely mutually reinforcing. To test our research question, we will examine whether auditors’ commercial activity is related to  indicators of audit quality such as individual performance evaluations and engagement quality reviews. We expect to find that firms reward auditors’ commercial activity. However, contrary to critics’ concerns, we also hypothesize that auditors’ commercial activity will be positively related to audit quality. For reasons discussed in this note, we argue that auditors who base their professional identity more on being successful at commercial endeavors will be more willing to access quality control mechanisms (e.g., ask for help from consultations). As far as we are aware, our examination will provide the first direct evidence on the beneficial effects of commercial motivations for auditors.

On June 20-21 2022, the fifth physical conference of the Foundation for Auditing Research (FAR) was held at Nyenrode Business University. The theme of the conference was ‘Inside out and outside in’. This theme allowed for a broad array of sessions that took issue with the influence of internal (e.g., audit teams) and external (e.g., regulators) factors on the quality of auditing and assurance and attracted an audience comprised of practitioners, academics, regulators, standard setters and journalists. The majority of the more than 100 participants were practicing auditors (45 percent). Given FAR’s objective of using academic knowledge to improve audit quality in practice, this is a satisfying figure.

KEY TAKE-AWAYS

Audit firm culture is viewed by regulators and inspectors as the means to enhance audit quality. This study uses the Competing Values Framework (CVF) to explore the culture of
large audit firms, and their attempts to change their cultures. We find that these firms predominantly emphasize a culture characterized by collaboration and control, which is consistent with an inward focus. We also find that audit firms struggle to implement a consistent understanding of culture across their offices and function levels, and there is a gap in how partners perceive culture compared to that of non-partner staff. This “culture gap” has negative consequences on auditors, as larger culture gaps are associated with lower psychological safety and poorer person organization fit. Embedding mechanisms can lower the culture gap, but having adequate resources is far more important of an embedding mechanism than “tone at the top.” The findings underscore the importance of actively communicating and reinforcing stated cultural values, and provide audit firms with a practical tool to diagnose problems in achieving culture change.

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