Prof. dr. Jeroen Suijs

Professor

Jeroen Suijs is Professor of Financial Accounting at the Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, where he also serves as Director of the Department of Business Economics. He earned his MSc in Econometrics and Operations Research and his PhD in cooperative game theory from Tilburg University. Before joining Erasmus in 2017, Jeroen held academic positions at Tilburg University and Rotterdam School of Management, including five years as Head of the Accountancy Department at Tilburg. He was a KNAW Academy Researcher from 1999 to 2004 and spent time as a visiting scholar at the Kellogg School of Management in the United States.His research focuses on the role of financial reporting in the functioning of capital markets and the economics of audit markets. He examines topics such as disclosure regulation, audit production processes, and the economic forces shaping audit quality. Jeroen has published in leading journals including Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, and Review of Accounting Studies. Recent work explores ESG materiality assessments, mandatory disclosure costs, and the valuation implications of unbundled disclosures.In addition to his research, Jeroen is actively involved in teaching and curriculum innovation, particularly in financial accounting education. He has led projects to digitize accounting exercises and improve student engagement through adaptive learning platforms. His work bridges academic insights with policy and practice, contributing to debates on audit regulation and financial transparency.

Het onderzoek van Gad, Litjens en Suijs sluit aan op de vraag vanuit de Foundation for Auditing Research of er behoefte bestaat aan ‘different audits for different purposes’. Moet en kan de audit voor een organisatie van openbaar belang (OOB) anders worden aangepakt dan bijvoorbeeld voor een onderneming die door een DGA wordt geleid?  
The Dutch market for mandatory audit services is heterogenous and includes publicly listed and private firms. While private firms dominate the market, existing audit research focusses primarily on listed firms where audit demand originates from external stakeholders such as shareholders assisting them in the monitoring of management. This is surprising as private firms represent a significant portion of the economy in most countries. Private firms generally face different incentives in terms of accounting and auditing demand. For example, private firms that are not run by owner-manager may have agency conflicts that drives the demand for audit. However, in private owner-managed firms external audit demand can arise from other, more internal, factors that are difficult to observe and less well understood, such as compensation for lacking internal controls. Legislators across the world seem to acknowledge this variation and mandate audits to a varying degree, for instance dependent on private firm size. Yet, institutional heterogeneity is large, varying from mandating audits for very few (e.g., United States) to all (e.g., Sweden) private firms. Furthering our understanding of internal value factors of private firm external audits and their effect on audit pricing, audit effort and audit quality is therefore relevant. It can assist regulators in determining the scope (which private firms) and features of a private firm audit (e.g. independence regulation, exclusion of certain non-audit services). Understanding internal value factors can assist auditors and audit firms in how to price and ‘produce’ private firm audits and the effects of these decisions on audit quality.  
The research study by Gad, Litjens en Suijs relates to the question of the Foundation for Auditing Research whether there exists a need for ‘different audits for different purposes’. Does the external audit of a public interest entity require a different approach than the external audit of an owner-managed business? In order to answer this question, it is appropriate to analyze the differences in value of the external audit for a public interest entity versus an owner-managed business.  

KEY TAKE-AWAYS

Audit firm culture is viewed by regulators and inspectors as the means to enhance audit quality. This study uses the Competing Values Framework (CVF) to explore the culture of
large audit firms, and their attempts to change their cultures. We find that these firms predominantly emphasize a culture characterized by collaboration and control, which is consistent with an inward focus. We also find that audit firms struggle to implement a consistent understanding of culture across their offices and function levels, and there is a gap in how partners perceive culture compared to that of non-partner staff. This “culture gap” has negative consequences on auditors, as larger culture gaps are associated with lower psychological safety and poorer person organization fit. Embedding mechanisms can lower the culture gap, but having adequate resources is far more important of an embedding mechanism than “tone at the top.” The findings underscore the importance of actively communicating and reinforcing stated cultural values, and provide audit firms with a practical tool to diagnose problems in achieving culture change.

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