Do Assigned Audit Partners Perform Higher Quality Audits Than Self-Selected Auditors?

Auditors are selected and paid for by the organizations they audit. Policymakers are concerned that this structure influences auditor independence which, in turn, impairs quality. Accordingly, policymakers consider whether audit quality is enhanced if the auditor is appointed by an external (independent) party.

The authors study the working of such a model in a natural setting for local subsidiary audits conducted by the big-4 as part of group audits, where the local auditor is either assigned to the subsidiary through parent firm management or self-selected by the subsidiary.

The authors find that audit partners assigned to subsidiaries receive less information from the auditee, issue fewer going concern opinions, identify fewer control deficiencies, identify and correct fewer misstatements, and are less likely to constrain earnings management compared to self-selected auditors.

Some further preliminary evidence the authors collect suggests that assigned auditors produce lower audit quality through effort reduction.