Anna Gold

Director of the Foundation for Auditing Research and Professor of Auditing

Anna Gold is Professor of Auditing at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Since 1 September she is also the Academic Director of the Foundation for Auditing Research. She is internationally recognized for her research on audit judgment and decision-making. With her strong academic background and practical focus, she plays a key role in connecting research with audit practice. In her role at FAR, she leads efforts to promote impactful and independent audit research.

As advanced audit data analytics (ADA), including artificial intelligence, become increasingly sophisticated, auditor consultations with in-house ADA specialists are likely to become commonplace. We examine whether auditors’ prior ADA consultation experience affects their superiors’ reliance on their ADA work performed independently of specialists. On the one hand, learning from ADA specialists through prior consultation may enhance auditors’ technological proficiency, increasing their superiors’ reliance on their ADA testing. On the other hand, a known history of consultation may signal dependence on specialists. This signal may conflict with superiors’ expectations that auditors can perform ADA tasks independently, triggering a backlash effect that ultimately undermines reliance.   In an experiment, we find that when an audit senior has prior experience consulting with ADA specialists, audit managers evaluate the senior as more competent, yet rely less on the senior’s independent ADA work. This pattern is consistent with a backlash effect. Prior consultation experience leads to lower superior reliance even when the subordinate’s ADA skills are low. This unexpected result is concerning, as backlash may discourage consultation even among auditors who need it most for learning and skill development (i.e., those with lower ADA skills). Our findings highlight the importance of managing the interpersonal dynamics of engagement teams when incorporating ADA into audits. 
Auditors often seek both formal and informal advice from a variety of sources, including specialists (e.g., IT, valuation, tax, and/or forensic experts), national offices, and engagement team members. This literature note reviews six academic studies on auditors’ use of advice and its impact on their professional judgment and audit quality. Specialists provide critical expertise, yet prior research finds that auditors often limit expert involvement due to concerns about budgets, deadlines, and client relationships. Furthermore, misaligned perceptions and communication gaps between auditors and specialists reduce effective knowledge sharing and integration of expertise. The need to balance between professionalism and client service further adds to the complexity of the issue. The quality of auditor-specialist relationships and the strength of shared team identity can influence auditors’ reliance on specialist advice. Positive relationships facilitate integration and mutual understanding, while strained relationships can hinder audit effectiveness. However, a strong identity or social bond may create trust heuristics (i.e., auditors overly rely on the advice regardless of its quality). Excessive dependence on seeking explicit knowledge – knowledge that can be accessed more efficiently elsewhere – from colleagues can harm auditor reputation and performance.
This literature note provides insights into how auditors assess and respond to fraud risks. Overall, the evidence shows that fraud audit effectiveness depends not only on standards and technical guidance, but also on judgment structures, cognitive framing, team dynamics, and tone at the top. First, auditors often recognize heightened fraud risk but can fail to translate that recognition into targeted, effective audit responses. Instead, they frequently rely on increases in sample sizes rather than designing substantive procedures focused specifically on the fraud area. Encouragingly, identifying more fraud-focused risk factors may enable auditors to more effectively modify standard audit programs in response to fraud risks. Second, how fraud risk assessment is structured and framed significantly influences auditor judgments. Expanding the traditional fraud triangle to incorporate management capability leads to higher fraud risk assessments. Presenting fraud information in frequency formats rather than probabilities improves judgments when fraud base rates are low. Compared to using a holistic fraud assessment approach, decomposing the likelihood and magnitude assessments makes the low likelihood of fraud more salient and leads to lower fraud risk assessments. These findings suggest that judgment aids with respect to fraud must be carefully designed and evaluated. Third, audit team dynamics and leadership emphasis on professional skepticism play a critical role. Audit teams’ high-quality fraud brainstorming strengthens the relations between risk factors, risk assessments, and audit responses. Moreover, partner emphasis on professional skepticism improves both the effectiveness and efficiency of auditors’ fraud judgments. Collectively, the literature highlights that improving fraud risk assessments and responses requires a multifaceted effort. Audit firms should focus on strengthening auditor fraud cue recognition, promoting targeted responses, refining fraud risk assessment aids, improving brainstorming practices, and reinforcing a tone at the top that prioritizes professional skepticism and audit effectiveness.
This paper draws on interviews with audit professionals in the Netherlands to investigate the decision-making processes involved in assessing and reporting on audit clients’ ability to continue as a going concern. Using Actor-Network-Theory, we conceptualize these decisions as a dynamic process, involving four interrelated stages. First, partners must recognize going concern as a critical issue of the audit (problematization). Second, they enlist a variety of internal and external actors to inform the assessment (interessement). Third, these actors are coordinated and monitored in the audit team’s preliminary evaluation (enrollment). Fourth, in consultation with national office, partners complete the going concern evaluation, including audit opinion wording and approval of financial statement disclosures (mobilization). By offering an in-depth process account of auditors’ going concern decisions, our study challenges prevailing portrayals in the literature as primarily individual or mechanistic. It also offers new insights and suggestions for future research into auditor going concern decisions.
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