FAR Practice Note - How is auditor commercialism related to audit quality?
It is taken for granted that a fundamental conflict exists between auditors’ professional responsibilities and their commercial interests. While there is no direct evidence to support this widely held belief, it nonetheless fuels extensive, costly regulatory and standard-setting activities. We propose to examine whether auditors’ commercial and professional motivations actually conflict. Moreover, we argue that quality control mechanisms in audit firms—e.g., performance evaluation and technical consultation procedures—create conditions in which the two sets of motivations are likely mutually reinforcing.
Authors
Assistant Professor of Accountancy University of Illinois
Justin Leiby is an Associate Professor of Accountancy, Disruption & Innovation Scholar, & Professor Ken Perry Faculty Fellow at the University of Illinois Gies College of Business. Justin’s teaching infuses empathic decision-making concepts into auditing, analytics, and risk management, helping students “bring empathy to the data” to better serve stakeholders. Professor Leiby’s research focuses on the motivations and incentives of professionals in areas such as professional skepticism, quality control, human capital, and diversity, equity, and inclusion. Professor Leiby has published research in leading scholarly journals and has presented to a variety of scholarly, regulatory, and professional audiences in the U.S., Canada, and Europe. He earned a doctorate at the University of Illinois and undergraduate degrees in Accounting and German at the University of Pittsburgh.
Full Professor of Accounting and Auditing at KU Leuven